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Abstract— Recently, ultra-wide-band (UWB)
technology has been approved for communi-
cation applications, utilising spectrum in use
by other technologies. Recent studies have
evaluated the technological impact of UWB on
UMTS, but not the corresponding economic
impact. This is of paramount importance, given
huge investments already made on UMTS.
Those studies also target "traditional" spec-
trum allocation. Dynamic spectrum allocation
(DSA) exploits temporal/spatial variations in
the "loads" of various networks. A recent
proposal implements DSA by periodically sell-
ing or auctioning short-term spectrum licenses,
and solves the problem of a participating
CDMA cell populated by delay-tolerant termi-
nals with dissimilar "willingness to pay" oper-
ating at various data rates, on the downlink.
In the present work, UWB personal/body area
networks (PAN/BAN) are introduced in the
aforementioned DSA environment. The UWB
networks utilise the spectrum for free, and do
not compete for customers against the CDMA
networks, but do increase the noise experienced
by the CDMA terminals. The present work
studies the economic impact of UWB on a
CDMA cell, and its terminals. Before consider-
ing DSA, the techno-economic management of
a CDMA cell with a fixed spectrum allocation
(relevant to present day networks) is studied.
The analysis reveals that neither the service
priorities nor the technological operating point
of the data terminals is affected by UWB.
Consequently, a served terminal’s contribution
to network revenues remain unchanged. The
network bears the brunt of UWB interference,
because the network can fit fewer terminals
in a given spectrum allocation, yet receives




(UWB) has been approved for
communication applications in the USA[1].
Europe has signalled movement in the
same direction, and other world regions are
expected to follow along similar lines in
the near future. Often-mentioned favourable
features of the UWB technology, in particular
its impulse-radio variety, include: noise-like
signalling, transceivers of potentially low
complexity and cost, resistance to severe
multipath impairment, and exceptional
location and tracking capabilities due to
excellent time domain resolution[2], [3],
[4]. Additionally, UWB technology enables
communication over segments of the radio
spectrum that are being used through other
technologies, leading to a form of “creation”
of wireless bandwidth[5].
Present regulations impose on UWB ap-
plications severe power-emission limits over
certain spectrum bands[1]. These limits are
intended to offer certain incumbent technolo-
gies a degree protection against UWB in-
terference. But even with these restrictions,
incumbent technologies can be adversely af-
fected by UWB. In particular, the possible
impact of UWB interference on UMTS net-
works have attracted significant attention re-
cently. One reason for this interest is the fact
that in many localities UMTS networks ob-
tained radio spectrum after paying enormous
sums of money in auctions. For instance, over
22 billion Great Britain pounds (at the time,
the equivalent to 2 12 % of the UK’s gross
domestic product, and enough for the building
of 400 hospitals) were raised by the British
Government in a recent auction of 5 UMTS
licenses [6]. Thus, determining the economic
impact of UWB services on UMTS is of
paramount importance.
Several recent works have focused on the
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impact of UWB networks on CDMA (espe-
cially UMTS) networks. Some have based
their studies on simulation experiments[7],
while others have relied on laboratory mea-
surements [8], [9]. These references and re-
lated ones differ from the present analysis in
that they have focused on purely technolog-
ical performance measures (such as the bit
error rate). These measures are important and
relevant to our aims. Nevertheless, they do not
capture the entire story. Spectrum allocation
is as much an economic problem as it is an
engineering one. Reference [10] appears to be
the only recent work that shares this interest
with us.
Another significant difference between the
present work and the literature concerns
the underlying spectrum “regime”. Reference
[10] and all other studies of UWB/UMTS
interaction of which we are aware have fo-
cused on the “traditional” spectrum alloca-
tion. Spectrum bands are first allocated to
specific radio-access technologies, such as
GSM, UMTS, and DVB-T. Subsequently, the
spectrum devoted to a technology is sub-
allocated, on a very-long-term basis (up to
decades), to specific business entities in-
terested in marketing communication ser-
vices. The traditional spectrum regime can
be very inefficient when the demand for var-
ious spectrum-dependent services ("loads")
varies widely along time and/or space. Thus,
several recent spectrum management propos-
als envision a spectrum management regime
based on dynamic spectrum allocation (DSA).
DSA seeks to exploit the temporal/spatial
variations in the "loads" of various radio-
access networks to allocate the spectrum
more efficiently[11].
In a specific recent DSA proposal available
in the scientific literature, a spectrum man-
ager implements DSA by periodically selling
or auctioning short-term spectrum licenses.
all of which simultaneously expire at the end
of a pre-specified short period [12], [13].
The problem of CDMA network populated
by delay-tolerant terminals operating at var-
ious data rates, on the downlink, and repre-
senting users with dissimilar "willingness to
pay" is solved. The network finds revenue-
maximising internal prices and a service pri-
ority policy, along with a bid or an optimal
amount of spectrum to purchase. Simple,
closed-form expressions are given for the
network’s optimal operating point (signal-to-
noise ratio), optimal bid or efficient amount
of spectrum, a terminal’s "revenue per Hertz"
service priority, as well as its contribution to
revenue and spectrum consumption, if served.
Reference [14] introduces a digital video
broadcast network in this market-driven DSA
scheme, while also providing a comprehen-
sive overview of recent relevant literature.
However, these references do not address the
possible existence of UWB networks oper-
ating over the spectrum being dynamically
allocated.
The present work revisits the DSA scheme
of [12], [13] to determine the effect of in-
troducing UWB personal and/or body area
networks (PAN/BAN) over the spectrum be-
ing dynamically allocated. It is specified that
UWB is used in support of PAN/BAN to
emphasise that UWB does not directly com-
pete against CDMA for customers wishing
data services. The UWB networks do not
participate in the market-driven DSA scheme,
either, because they are presumed to co-
utilise all the spectrum, all the time, for free.
However, the UWB networks do impact the
DSA, as they increase the "noise floor" of
the terminals operating in the downlink of
the CDMA networks. The present work an-
alytically characterises the economic impact
of the presence of these UWB PAN/BAN on
the CDMA networks, on the terminals ("cus-
tomers") and, indirectly, on the revenue raised
by the spectrum manager. Although the focus
is ultimately on a market-driven DSA regime,
the analysis also provides valuable insights
on the economic impact of the introduction
of the UWB, under a traditional spectrum
regime.
The rest of the paper revisits, clarifies,
re-interpret and to a modest degree ex-
tends the analysis of [12], [13], seeking to
understand the techno-economic impact of
UWB PAN/BAN. In section II, the phys-
ical model and the basic rationale of the
terminals are specified. Section III performs
techno-economic resource management for
the downlink of a CDMA cell populated
by data terminals. Section III assumes a
fixed allocation of spectrum, as in present-
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day networks, and provides the foundation for
the subsequent analysis. Section IV utilises
the preceding results to derive the optimal
amount of spectrum that the CDMA network
should purchase if it can obtain any desired
amount at a unit price (as in [12]). Subse-
quently, also on the basis of the analysis of
section III, section V revisits the participation
of the CDMA network in the DSA auction
scheme of [13]. After each of sections III ,
IV , and V the main objective of the present
work is directly addressed, through an exam-
ination of the “sensitivity” of the results to a
change on the “noise level”, which is the chief
technological effect of the UWB PAN/BAN.
The present work concludes with a summary
and discussion of key findings, and comments
on future directions for this line of research.
II. GENERALITIES
A. Physical Model
Before proceeding with the analysis, we
specify in greater detail the physical model.
1) N is the number of terminals receiving
data simultaneously from a CDMA base
station (BS) (downlink operation). The
BS has a total downlink power con-
straint of P̄.
2) Ri bps is the data rate of terminal i
3) RC cps is the chip rate of the channel,
common to all terminals. For conve-
nience, we set RC = W , where W is the
total bandwidth (spectrum) allocated to
the cell.
4) Gi = W/Ri is the spreading (process-
ing) gain of terminal i.
5) Information is sent in M-bit packets
carrying L < M information bits.
6) fS(xi) is the packet-success-rate func-
tion (PSR) giving the probability of
correct reception of a data packet as
a function of the signal-to-interference
ratio (SIR) at the receiver. Below,
f (x) := fS(x)− fS(0) replaces fS(x) to
avoid certain technical problems. As an
example, for non-coherent FSK mod-
ulation, with packet size M=80, inde-
pendent bit errors, no forward error
correction, and perfect error detection,




However, we stress that our analysis
does not rely on this or any specific
PSR. We assume that all we know
about the physical layer is that the
PSR has the “S” shape shown in figure
1. The technical characterisation of an
“S-curve” and some useful results are
given in [15].
7) Following [16], we assume that in the
downlink, the CDMA signatures re-
tain their orthogonality, and effectively
eliminate intra-cell interference (or that
it is included as part of the random
noise). Thus, the received SIR is ob-
tained as xi = GihiPi/σ2 with Pi the
downlink power, hi the path gain, and
σ2 the average noise power at the re-
ceiver.
8) Packets received in error which can-
not be corrected result in ideal re-
transmissions until correctly received
and confirmed.
A relatively simple analysis tells us that, on
the average, the number of information bits
successfully transferred by a terminal over the
time interval τ is:
Bi(xi) = τ(L/M)Ri f (xi) (1)
B. Behaviour of the terminals
We must specify the behaviour of a data
terminal that can choose resources, in the
presence of pricing. We focus strictly on the
downlink of a single CDMA cell.
We assume a utility function of the form
βiBi + yi where (i) βi is the monetary value
to the terminal of one information bit suc-
cessfully transferred (a constant for a given
terminal), (ii) Bi is the (average) number of
information bits the terminal has successfully
transferred within a reference length of time,
say τ, and (iii) yi is the amount of money
the terminal has left after any charges and re-
wards are computed. This model is grounded
on the micro-economic concepts of quasi-
linear utility function, and partial-equilibrium
analysis [17, Ch. 10].
Bi depends on the SIR, xi (a physical index
of quality of service) . When the terminal
must pay ci(xi) for QoS level xi, it chooses xi
to maximise βiBi(xi) + [Di − ci(xi)]. βiBi(xi)
is the “value” to the terminal of the bits it
gets to transfer over the reference period (the
terminal’s “benefit”), and Di is the terminal’s
monetary budget. Di is just a constant for a
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Fig. 1. Pricing for revenue maximisation: With an SIR of x, S(x) represents the terminal’s “benefits”, or the
monetary “value” of the bits it gets to transfer over a reference period. S(x) ∝ f (x) (the packet-success rate
function (PSR)). When QoS is costly, the terminal maximises benefits minus costs, that is S(x)−cx. With c = ck,
it chooses x = xk to satisfy S′(xk) = ck (e.g., T 1, the tangent of S at x1 is parallel to c1x), provided that its cost
ckxk does not exceed its “benefit” S(xk). The largest c for which the terminal will operate is c∗, the slope of the
only tangent of S that goes through the origin. For ck ≤ c∗ network’s revenues are ckxk ≡ xkS′(xk) (blue dash
curve). The graph xS′(x) is single-peaked. With the constraint c ≤ c∗ , the curve xS′(x) (revenues) is maximised
at x = x∗ corresponding to c = c∗. x∗ does not change when S is replaced by a multiple of S; thus, the same x∗
is shared by all terminals with common PSR.
given terminal, which limits its total expendi-
ture. If Di is relatively “large”, it needs not be
considered. Thus, the terminal chooses QoS




MANAGEMENT OF A CDMA CELL
A. Optimisation problem of a network
Regardless of the spectrum regime, the net-
work is interested in managing its spectrum
efficiently. A key aspect of efficient spectrum
management is pricing. Pricing is the key to
revenue generation (with which spectrum can
be payed), as well as a tool to encourage a
conscientious use of network resources. Once
the network has set an appropriate price rule,
it can determine the terminals’ “demand”
for services, as well as the revenues that
can be obtained from a given amount of
spectrum. With this information, the network
can then determine how much spectrum to
purchase (under the scenario of [12]), or how
to bid for spectrum (under the scenario of
[14]). Below, we neglect the effect of the
competition among networks. The monopoly
analysis provides some useful “bounds”: it
is the “best case scenario” for the network,
and the “worst case scenario” for the end-
user. Additionally, this analysis is a useful
approximation of the “oligopoly” situation
often observed in practise, in which relatively
few firms dominate the market in a given
region.
B. Terminal choice under linear pricing
1) Selling power or SIR?: For a fixed
amount of spectrum, it is natural for the
network to charge each terminal per unit of
allocated downlink power (the limited “re-
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source” to be allocated). However, for a given
bandwidth, a price per Watt can be easily
converted to a price per received SIR. To see
this, suppose that the terminal must pay ĉ
per downlink Watt. Since the received SIR
is obtained as xi = GihiPi/σ2, in order to
enjoy an SIR of xi, the terminal must order
(σ2/Gihi)xi Watts of downlink power, for
which it must pay (σ2/Gihi)ĉxi. This payment
can be written as cixi with ci := (σ2/Gihi)ĉ.
Likewise, the network can convert a price
per SIR to an equivalent price per Watt:
ĉ = ciGihi/σ2. Thus, one can assume that the
network charges the terminal per delivered
SIR (QoS).
Notice that direct SIR-pricing is even more
natural in the scenario of section IV, where it
is implicit assumed that the network can buy
any necessary amount of spectrum from the
manager.
2) Terminal’s response to linearly priced
SIR: Per section II-B, the terminal chooses
its received SIR xi to maximise benefits minus
cost: βiBi(xi)− cixi, with Bi given by eq. 1.
βiBi(xi) is just a multiple of the PSR and in-
herits its shape. Thus, we need to understand
the maximisation of an expression of the form
S(x)− cx, where S is some S-curve.
Figure 1 illustrates the solution procedure.
First, if the line cx lies entirely above S, ex-
cept at the origin, the terminal should choose
x = 0 (decline to operate), since its cost
would exceed its benefit for any positive x.
Otherwise, the maximising choice is a point
at which the derivative of the S-curve equals
c. The derivative of the S-curve is “single-
peaked” (similar to the curve xS′(x) shown in
fig. 1). Therefore, if c is sufficiently large, no
value of x can satisfy S′(x) = c. Otherwise,
two values of x satisfy S′(x) = c, and the
maximiser is the largest of the two, that is,
the one to the right of the inflexion point of S,
where the second derivative S′′(x) is negative.
The largest value of c for which the prob-
lem of maximising S(x)− cx has a positive
solution is denoted as c∗, and as shown in
fig. 1, is obtained as the slope of the unique
tangent line of S that goes through the origin.
It is easy to see that replacing S with a mul-
tiple of S will change c∗. On the other hand,
basic analytical geometry tells us that x∗ must
satisfy S(x∗) = x∗S′(x∗), which immediately
implies that replacing S with a multiple of
S has no effect on the value of x∗. Thus,
if S1 and S2 are multiple of the same PSR,
they share the same x∗ (shown also in fig.
1); that is, x∗ is determined by the physical
layer, through the PSR. c∗ and x∗ are related
by c∗ = S′(x∗) = S(x∗)/x∗
C. Optimal linear pricing
Section III-B tells us how the terminal
reacts given a linear cost function set by the
network. As c grows, the terminal chooses
smaller values of x. Thus, a higher c may ac-
tually lead to lower network revenue. Hence,
it is not obvious from the network’s point
of view what is the “best” c. To determine
such c, the network needs to understand how
its revenue varies as a function of c. In
addressing this issue, we shall first assume
that a single terminal is active. Subsequently,
we will generalise.
1) Only one terminal : As discussed
above, and illustrated by fig. 1, for a given
ck ≤ c∗, the terminal will choose an SIR (QoS
level) xk satisfying S′(xk) = ck; that is, at xk
the tangent to S is parallel to ckx (e.g., T 1, the
tangent of S at x1, is parallel to c1x). Then, the
resulting network’s revenue is ckxk ≡ xkS′(xk).
Thus, the network’s revenue follow the curve
xS′(x).
The curve xS′(x) has a “bell shape” (same
as S′(x)) with a single “peak” at xR. In
principle, the network would like to drive the
terminal to choose xR, the point at which the
curve xS′(x) reaches its maximum. But this
curve crosses S at the point x∗, which lies
to the right of xR, and it has already been
established that the terminal will not operate
to the left of x∗ (c > c∗). For any x > x∗,
xS′(x) < x∗S′(x∗) as shown in fig. 1. Thus,
the best the network can do is to set c = c∗,
and receive revenue equals to
c∗x∗ ≡ x∗S′(x∗) = S(x∗) (3)
The network is interested in maximising
profit, not revenue. It is in principle possi-
ble that the revenue-maximising choice may
differ from the profit-maximising choice, be-
cause of cost considerations. However, by set-
ting its price to c∗, the network drives the ter-
minal to operate at x∗, the lowest SIR which
the terminal finds acceptable. The smaller
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the SIR, the smaller the spectrum needs (for
a given power constraint). Thus, by setting
a price c∗ the network is both maximising
revenues and minimising spectrum costs. This
provides the highest achievable level of profit,
while serving this terminal. But below it will
become clear that it is not necessarily optimal
for the network to serve a given terminal.
2) Many terminals: The analysis in
the preceding section identifies clearly the
revenue-maximising linear price, c∗, and the
utility-maximising SIR value, x∗. But the
analysis focus on a single terminal, and as-
sumes that the network knows the terminal
utility function (specifically the β coefficient,
which denotes the monetary value to the ter-
minal of a correctly transferred bit). When the
β′s are known to the network, it is straight-
forward to extend the preceding analysis to
a many-terminal situation, provided that the
network can set an individual price per ter-
minal (“price discrimination”). The case in
which terminals are non-identical, but the
network is forced to offer the same price to
all terminals is more complex. And if the
network does not know the β′s, all cases
(even the single-terminal one) become more
complicated. Below we shall continue to as-
sume that the network has full knowledge of
the terminal’s utility functions, and can set
individual prices.
From the analysis summarised in the cap-
tion to fig. 1, we know that the network will
choose for terminal i a price c∗i obtained as
the slope of the only tangent to Si that goes
through the origin. (Si(xi) = βiBi(xi) with Bi
given by equation 1).
From the discussion in section III-B, we
know that if the terminals share an identical
PSR, f , then each Si is a multiple of the
common f , and the terminals will choose
an identical SIR x∗(that is, the network will
choose c∗i such that each terminal’s best re-
sponse is to choose xi = x∗).
D. Service priority: Revenue per Hertz
The preceding analysis indicates that all
terminals (having the same link layer configu-
ration) should operate at the same SIR value.
But with fixed spectrum allocation and power
constraint, it is not necessarily possible for
the network to serve all terminals.
The network must allocate the available
downlink power among all served terminals.























Given system parameters and the network
state, it may not be possible to serve all
terminals and obey constraint (5). Thus, the
network must determine a service priority that
specifies which terminals are served under a
given network state.
Given our interest in spectrum manage-














From constraint (6) we notice that the
effect of the channel gains on resource con-
sumption is equivalent to an “amplification”
of the data rates. That is, a data rate of Ri
with a channel gain hi is (for resource usage
purposes) equivalent to a data rate of R̂i under
a perfect channel (hi = 1), where R̂i := Ri/hi.
The amount of bandwidth consumed by





W0 is then the amount of bandwidth required
by a terminal per unit of “amplified” data
rate. For notational convenience, the units of
measurements can be chosen such that W0 = 1
(bandwidth can be measured as a multiple of
W0).
A reasonable techno-economic criterion to
choose the set of terminals to be served is
to choose among all the set of terminals that
satisfy constraint (6), the set that yields the
most revenue.
From equations (1) and (6), the revenue
provided by terminal i, if served, is given by
τ(L/M) f (x∗)βiRi (9)
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For a fixed link layer, shared by all termi-
nals, the expression τ(L/M) f (x∗) is simply a
constant that can be absorbed in the (time)
unit. Thus, the revenue provided by terminal
i if served can be written as simply βiRi.
A relevant piece of information that can
help the network choose which terminals
to serve is the amount of revenue a given
terminal contributes per unit of resource it
consumes, that is, its “revenue per Hertz”
contribution. With convenient units, termi-





Notice that the other effect of the channel
gains is to “attenuate” the “willingness to
pay” of the terminals. That is, a willingness
to pay of βi with a channel gain hi is (for
priority purposes) equivalent to a willingness
to pay of β̂i under a perfect channel (hi = 1),
where β̂i := βihi.
Now, with the terminals’ labels such that
β1h1 ≥ ·· · ≥ βNhN , a reasonable and simple
service criterion emerges: serve terminals 1









More formally, what the network needs to
do is to choose out of all the combinations of
terminals that satisfy the resource constraint,
(11), the combination that maximises rev-
enue. It turns out that such decision problem
is a version of the well-known “knapsack
problem”. In this problem, there is a set of n
items, each characterised by a “weight” and
a “benefit” (measured as a positive number).
The objective is to find the combination of
items that maximises the sum of the benefits
of the chosen items, without exceeding a total
weight constraint (the “knapsack capacity”).
The problem is NP-hard, but for its solution,
there are many well-studied algorithms that
perform well in practise [18]. In fact, the
service criterion described above provides
an optimal solution under two scenarios: (i)
inequality (11) is (luckily) satisfied as an
equality, or (ii) we are allowed to choose,
in addition to terminals 1 . . . I∗, “a fraction”
of terminal I∗ + 1 in order to use up all the
available resource [19]. Notice that serving
“a fraction” of a terminal can be interpreted
as admitting it at a fraction of its data rate
(which could very well be possible and rea-
sonable). Further discussion of the knapsack
problem and its solution is beyond the scope
of the present work. Below, we assume that
the “revenue per Hertz” service criterion de-
scribed above is, for our purposes, sufficiently
close to the optimum.
E. UWB impact
The chief technological impact of the pres-
ence of UWB PAN/BAN is an increase in
“the noise floor”, that is, our parameter σ2.
However, depending upon the “popularity” of
the UWB networks, it is possible that some
data terminals are sufficiently far from any
such network, that the noise level experienced
by any such terminal remains unchanged.
Other data terminals may be only moder-
ately close to UWB networks, while some
others may be “surrounded” by several UWB
PAN/BAN. To capture this situation, we must
reconsider the preceding analysis in a model
in which each terminal faces its own noise
level, σ2i . This is tedious, but straightforward.
On the other hand, if the UWB technology
becomes very popular, one can envision a
situation in which all data terminals face the
same level of increased noise level (wherever
a data terminal goes, there are UWB networks
nearby). This situation would leave the pre-
ceding analysis unchanged, except that the
parameter σ2 would represent a significantly
larger value.
1) UWB impact on a given terminal: Be-
fore we understand the system-wide techno-
economic impact of the introduction of UWB,
we need to understand how it affects a given
terminal. We first notice that the development
through section III-C.1 applies unchanged.
Up to that point, σ2 is just a constant of non-
specified value. This allows us immediately to
conclude that, after the introduction of UWB,
a “victim” data terminal :
• will operate at the same signal to inter-
ference ratio, x∗ it did without UWB.
• will necessitate a higher level of down-
link power (to achieve this SIR). From
equation (4) it follows that the increase
in power is given by (with σ2U the new
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• will consume more bandwidth per unit
data rate (obtained directly from equa-
tion (7))
• will pay the network the same total
amount (for a given time period). This
may seem puzzling. Yet, close inspec-
tion of the preceding development shows
that what the terminal pays the network
equals “the value” of the bits it gets to
transfer over the reference period. As
long as the terminal continues to operate
at the same SIR, x∗, its contribution
to revenues is given by equation (9),
which does not explicitly depend on the
particular value of σ2.
• The network bears the brunt of the eco-
nomic impact of UWB. The terminal
consumes more, but pays the same.
2) Impact at the system level (high popu-
larity): The key system level impact of UWB
on the CDMA cell is a reduction in capacity.
The terminals operate at the previous SIR,
but each “victimised” terminal requires more
downlink power (or bandwidth) to achieve
that SIR. Specifically, W0, the amount of
bandwidth required by a terminal per unit
of “amplified” data rate, grows linearly with
noise. This has a direct impact on the capacity
constraint (6). For example, if noise power
doubles, the right-hand-side of constraint (6)
is cut in half.
The increase of W0 affects all terminals
equally. Thus, under the new system-wide
value of noise, the ordinal service priorities
(the indices of the terminals in the devel-
opment leading to inequality (11)) remain
unchanged. But the value of I∗, the largest
index such that inequality (11) is satisfied,
could register a significant drop. Thus, al-
though each served terminal pays the same to
the network as in the non-UWB scenario, the
total number of terminals than can be served
is lower. This leads to an exact expression for
the economic loss to the network. If without
UWB terminals 1 through I∗ can be served,
but with UWB only terminals 1 through i∗ <
I∗ can be served, then the network revenue





IV. SPECTRUM PURCHASE UNDER A
LINEAR PRICE REGIME
With the results obtained in section III
one can easily obtain the optimal amount
of spectrum that the CDMA network should
purchase if it can obtain any desired amount
at a unit price (as in [12]).
A. Which terminals to serve
Although now the network can presumably
purchase any desired amount of spectrum,
say at a unit cost of κ, depending upon the
value κ, and the willingness to pay of the
terminals, it may not make sense to serve
certain terminals.
Terminal i contributes revenue of
τ(L/M) f (x∗)βiRi (equation (9)), but
consumes bandwidth W0Ri/hi. This terminal
should be served only if its contribution to
revenue exceeds the cost of serving it. This
condition can be expressed in several ways
to facilitate interpretation. With spectrum
sold at a unit price, the terminal should be
served only if its contribution to revenues
per unit of spectrum usage exceeds the unit
cost of spectrum. That is, terminal i should








βihi ≥ κ (14)
Of course, for given power parameters and
link layer configuration, the units can be
chosen so that the admission takes the simpler
form: “serve terminal i only if βihi ≥ 1”.
Again, it makes sense to label the terminals
so that β1h1 ≥ ·· · ≥ βNhN . Then, only termi-
nals 1 through J∗ should be served, with J∗
the maximal index whose terminal satisfies
the admission condition.
B. Spectrum purchase
The optimal amount of spectrum is the
minimum amount that allows the service of
all of those terminals that passed the admis-
sion criterion. It can be directly obtained with
inequality (6) taken as equality, as :
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C. Network profit
The difference between total revenue and
total cost yields the network’s profit. If we
only consider spectrum-related cost, the net-
work’s profit is given by (with monetary units













D. Link layer configuration
The left-hand-side of (14) provides an in-
teresting piece of information. The product
of ratios (L/M) f (x∗)/x∗ is entirely deter-
mined by the link layer configuration (modu-
lation/coding). If several such configurations
are available, other things being equal, the
configuration that yields the maximal product
(L/M) f (x∗)/x∗leads to maximal revenue per
Hertz.
E. UWB impact
Unless otherwise indicated, the conclusions
of section III-E continue to apply.
Under the present regime, a terminal is
directly impacted through the admission con-
dition (14). An increase in σ2 reduces the left-
hand side of (14). Thus, an originally admis-
sible terminal may become inadmissible after
UWB becomes active. Therefore, the index
J∗of (15) may decrease.
It is not clear how the optimal amount of
spectrum given by (15) varies. On the one
hand, fewer terminals may be served. But
on the other hand, the amount of spectrum
consumed by any served terminal will be
larger (because W0, spectrum consumed per
unit data rate is now larger).
Equation (16) reveals the impact on net-
work’s profit. First, if fewer terminals are
served, the sum contains fewer (positive)
terms, leading to a lesser total. Additionally,
an increase in σ2 leaves revenues unchanged,
while increasing W0. Thus, the profit derived
by the network from each served terminal
(each term inside parenthesis in (16)) de-
creases. The difference in the profit obtained
from servicing terminal i can be written as










Selling spectrum at a unit price seems
plausible, for instance, when the state wants
to allocate the spectrum reasonably efficiently
without a significant concern for revenue, and
when there is a relatively large number of
spectrum buyers, none with enough power to
influence the “market clearing price”. Auc-
tions appears to be a more reasonable ar-
rangement in other cases. Choosing the “best”
auction format to perform DSA can itself
be the object of research. Below we assume
that the interested parties has settled on a
format in which it is optimal for each selfish
participant to submit a bid that equals its true
“valuation” of a short-term spectrum license.
One such format is the multi-unit version of
the auction proposed by [20].
A. Multi-Unit Vickrey Auction
The multi-unit second-price (Vickrey) auc-
tion when applied to spectrum allocation
works as follows. The available spectrum is
divided into K bands, each of width w. We
assume that a network cares about how many
but not which bands he is assigned (all bands
are equally good for the considered radio
access technologies). Each network submits
a bid vector with K components. The first
component means how much the bidder of-
fers to pay for the first band assigned to
him (whichever it is). The kth component
means how much he offers to pay for an
additional band if k− 1 bands have already
been assigned to him. The spectrum manager
receives all the bid vectors and assigns the
bands as follows: first, the top overall bid (by
looking at the components of all bid vectors)
gets one band, the second highest bid wins
the next band, and so on, until the K bands
have been assigned. Notice that the overall
highest and the second highest bids could be
components of the same vector. Thus, the first
several bands (possibly all) could go to the
same bidder. A critical detail is that what
a winner pays for a band depends on the
losing bids of the opponents. For the first won
band, a bidder will pay the highest losing
bid submitted by the other bidders; for the
next won band, he will pay the second-highest
losing bid (excluding his own), and so on.
Thus, a bidder that has won k bands, will pay
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the sum of the k highest losing bids submitted
by the other bidders. (Ties are broken at
random).
For example, let K = 3. A bid (b1, b2, b3)
means: I offer to pay b1 if I end up with a
total of one band allocated to me (I don’t
care which one), I offer b1 +b2 for a total of
two bands, and I offer b1 + b2 + b3 for all 3
bands. Suppose that only two bid vectors are
submitted: b1= (5, 3,2) and b2=(4.5,4,1). The
assignment goes as follows: one of the bands
goes to bidder 1 (5 is top overall bid), the next
band goes to bidder 2 (second highest bid is
4.5), the last band also goes to bidder 2 (the
third highest bid is 4, the second component
of b2). Since bidder 1 won only one band,
he will pay the highest losing bid submitted
by bidder 2, which was 1. Bidder 2 won
two bands, and will pay the sum of the two
highest losing bids submitted by bidder 1, that
is, 3+2=5. Thus, the auctioneer will get a total
of 6.
B. Optimisation problem of a network
The main question the network must an-
swer is how much to bid for spectrum at a
given DSA period. At the moment of bidding,
the network will know (or have a reliable
prediction) of the number and characteristics
of the terminals wishing to (continue to)
operate, including the details of the physi-
cal communication layer (modulation, error-
control coding, mode of diversity, etc). A
distinguishing feature of the chosen auction
format is that the bidder “best response” is to
bid his “true valuation” of the object being
auctioned. This implies that the first compo-
nent of a bid vector should equal the maximal
revenue that the network could obtain if it
gets a single band of spectrum (and nothing
else). The second component should equal
the extra revenue it would get if instead of
only one band, it gets a total of two, etc.
But the network’s revenue also depends on its
own pricing policies. Thus, the network must
determine its own (internal) pricing policy
along with the bid. Both can be determined
on the basis of the analysis in section III.
In determining a network’s end-user pric-
ing, we continue to neglect, the competition
among networks. This analysis may be a
useful approximation of the situation often
observed in practise, in which relatively few
networks dominate a given region in the pro-
vision of specific data services.
C. Optimal SIR and Optimal Price
In order to determine its bid, the network
must find the maximal amount of revenue
that it can obtain from the various possible
amounts of spectrum it may win. But section
III tells us precisely how to price a fixed
amount of spectrum for revenue maximisa-
tion, and in which order to arrange the termi-
nals for service. Thus, the network just needs
to apply the results of section III, with W
equal to the pertinent amount of spectrum (for
a single band W = w).
D. Service priority and Bidding
1) Service priority: revenue per Hertz:
The analysis and results of section III-D
continue to apply. Terminals should be served
in the order of their “revenue per Hertz”.
With the terminals’ labels such that β1h1 ≥
·· · ≥ βNhN , the service criterion is simple and
clear: serve terminals 1 through I∗1 , with I
∗
1 the









2) Bidding: The preceding subsection tells
us immediately what the network should of-
fer for a single band (the first component




convenient units, terminal i contribution to
revenue is βiRi). To know how much to bid
for an additional band, the key is to determine
the additional terminals that can be served,
which would tell us the additional revenue
brought by the band. Assuming that the chip
rate can be adjusted to match a larger band-
width (this is not strictly necessary), we can
multiply the right-hand side of constraint (18)
by two, and obtain I∗2 as the largest index
that can satisfy the new constraint, meaning
that terminals I∗1 + 1 through I
∗
2 could now
be served. Likewise, we can determine that
terminals I∗2 +1 through I
∗
3 could additionally
be served with a third band, and so on. Then,
the jth component of the bid has the simple






Authorized licensed use limited to: Universitatsbibliothek Karlsruhe. Downloaded on December 5, 2008 at 05:16 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
and represents the contribution to revenues of
the additional terminals that can be served if
the jth band is won.
For example, suppose there are 3 total
bands and a particular network has 6 active
terminals. With labels such that β1h1 > · · · >
β6h6 (terminal 1 offers the most “revenue per
Hertz”, if served), a bid vector has the form:[
β1R1 +β2R2 (β3R3 + · · ·+β5R5) β6R6
]
(20)
Thus, this network would serve terminals
1, and 2 if it wins at least one band (the
“spectrum consumption” of these terminals,
R1/h1 + R2/h2, uses up a spectrum band).
If the network wins two bands, terminals
3, 4 and 5 would also be served (the sum
R3/h3 +R4/h4 +R5/h5 uses up another spec-
trum band). The sixth terminal would only be
served if the network wins all 3 bands.
E. Impact of UWB
Unless otherwise indicated, the conclusions
of section III-E continue to apply. The opti-
mal operating point (the SIR x∗) is determined
by the link layer, and does not change after
a raise in the noise level. The total payment
by a terminal over a reference period of time
equals the value of the bits it gets to trans-
fer. This value remains unchanged by UWB,
because the service SIR remains unchanged.
The chief impact of UWB on the auctions can
be seen through constraint (18). A raise in the
noise level, raises W0 (bandwidth consumed
per unit data rate), decreasing the right-hand-
side of (18). Thus, fewer terminals can be
served if the band is won.
The network bids equals the revenue con-
tributed by all served terminals. The rev-
enue contribution of any such terminal is
unchanged by UWB. But the network loses
the revenues of the terminals not served,
which is reflected in the network’s bid for
the concerned band. If all networks face an
analogous situation, all bids will be lower,
which will reduce the auctioneer’s revenues.
For example, after UWB becomes active,
bid (20) may have to be modified as:
[
β1R1 (β2R2 +β3R3) (β4R4 +β5R5)
]
(21)
In the redone example, only terminal 1
fits in the first band. Now, terminal 2 can
be served (together with terminal 3) only
if a second band is won. And if all bands
are won, terminals 4 and 5 are additionally
served. Terminal 6 cannot now be served. The
total amount bid by the network is obviously
lower, as is the value of the first component.
VI. DISCUSSION
We have revisited and extended previous
work on techno-economic spectrum manage-
ment. Our approach has been to examine how
certain critical expressions change after a rise
in the noise level (the chief technological
effect if UWB personal/body area networks
become wide spread). The general context
has been that of a market-driven dynamic
spectrum allocation regime, where networks
acquire (through bidding or direct purchase)
spectrum licenses for short term use. But
before analysing the DSA regime, we dis-
cussed the techno-economic management of a
CDMA cell with a fixed spectrum allocation.
The fixed-spectrum discussion is relevant to
present day networks.
Section III-E contains the core of our
conclusions. The operating point of the data
terminals operating on the downlink of a
CDMA cell is unaffected by UWB. In turn,
this implies that their contribution to network
revenues remain unchanged. Thus, the net-
work bears the brunt of an increase in noise
resulting from UWB, because the network
can fit fewer terminals in a given amount of
spectrum, yet receives an unchanged amount
of revenues from those terminals it serves.
This analysis is more relevant to a situation
where UWB PAN/BAN are highly popular. In
this scenario, the CDMA data terminals face
increase noise regardless of their location. If
the UWB networks are very disperse, then
their effect would be minimal: most times,
most CDMA terminals will be sufficiently far
from an UWB network not to be significantly
affected.
Our development has been so far entirely
analytical. However we continue to examine
recent experimental work on the technolog-
ical impact of UWB PAN/BAN on UMTS
terminals. On the basis of such experimental
work we hope to provide numerical illustra-
tions in future versions of this work.
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